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राजपत्र, हिमाचल प्रदेश

हिमाचल प्रदेश राज्य शासन द्वारा प्रकाशित

सोमवार, 16 जुलाई, 2018 / 25 आषाढ़, 1940

हिमाचल प्रदेश सरकार

LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018

No. LLR-E(9)-1/2018.—In continuation of this Department's Notifications of even number dated 7th March, 2018 and 17th March, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order to appoint Sh. Akshay Amritanshu, Advocate, (D/1004/2014) C41, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi-110014 (Phone:+91 99312-82222), as panel Advocate to represent the State of Himachal Pradesh before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil/Criminal cases with immediate effect.

2. This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be withdrawn at any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.

3. The other terms and conditions as contained in the Notification of this Department No. LLR-E(9)1/88-III (Loose) dated 28th May, 2012 and 31st July, 2012 would continue to apply to the said panel Advocate.

4. All the Departments are requested that whenever they need the services of any Advocate in the particular Civil/Criminal case or in cases of vital importance to the State, they may engage above Advocate with the prior approval of the Law Department and in consultation with the Advocate General, Himachal Pradesh.

By order
Sd/-
LR-cum-Pr. Secretary (Law).

LAW DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2, the 3rd July, 2018

No. LLR-E(9)-2/2018.—In supersession of the previous Notification(s) issued from time to time with regard to empanelment of Advocates to defend the Revenue Cases in Kangra District, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to make a new panel of the following Advocates to represent the State of Himachal Pradesh in Board/Bank/Trust/Committee/Corporation and Revenue Cases pending before the various Courts in **District Kangra** with immediate effect:—

Sl. No.	Name & Address of Advocate S/Sh./Smt.	Name of Institution	Terms and Conditions of fee for Revenue Courts
		Nurpur Court	
1.	Ajay Pathania	NHAI, KCC Bank, UHF Nauni	Rs. 1500/- (Rupees One Thousand Five hundred) per case + Rs. 200/- as miscellaneous expenses including typing expenses.
2.	Arun Jarial	HRTC & SDM Court Nurpur	-do-
3.	Sonu Pundra	H.P. Electricity Board Tehsildar/Naib Tehsildar Court.	-do-
4.	Aditya Sharma	Civil Supplies Corpn. HPKV Palampur.	-do-
5.	Sachit Sharma	Forest Corporation	-do-
6.	Udhaybir Singh	Education Board, M.C.Nurpur	-do-
7.	Naresh Dhiman	H.P. Pollution CB	-do-

8.	Shekhar Gupta	Forest Corporation	-do-
		Indora Court	
1.	Ashwani Mahant	HRTC, SDM Court Nurpur	-do-
2.	Rohit Minhas	Tehsildar & Naib Tehsildar Court	-do-
3.	Sanjeev Kumar	Pollution Control Board and Civil Supplies Corpn.	-do-
4.	Shyam Dadwal	SDM & Tehsil Court	-do-
5.	Sourav Sharma	HPSEB & H.P. Education Board, KCC Bank and Forest Corpn.	-do-
6.	Prashant Katoch	Forest Corporation	-do-
		Palampur Court	
1.	D.S. Parmar	CSKHPKV, KCC Bank & HRTC	-do-
2.	Manoj Sharma	HRTC, KCC Bank & H.P. Road & Infrastructure.	-do-
3.	Arvind Vashist	H.P. Agro Ind. HPSEB, KCC Bank	-do-
4.	Arvind Mehta	HPSEB, HPHIM Fed, KCC Bank	-do-
5.	Adarsh Sood	Him Urja, H.P. State Education, HPSEB.	-do-
6.	Hitesh Nag	KCC Bank, Civil Supplies Corporation.	-do-
7.	Mahesh Sharma	H.P. Emp. W/W Board, KCC Bank, HPPCL.	-do-
8.	Bhanu Udai Singh	KCC Bank, HPMC, RKS Palampur	-do-
9.	Vikas Sapehiya	Kangra Mortgage Bank HPGIC	-do-
10.	Binder Kapoor	H.P. Wool Federation, Naib Tehsildar Court Palampur.	-do-
11.	Gagan Katoch	Tehsildar Court Palampur Standing Counsel.	-do-
12.	Kapil Chaudhary	OBC Commission Kangra	-do-
13.	Hema Bhat	H.P. SC ST Corpn.	-do-
14.	Bhawana Thakur	H.P. Women Child Welfare Board	-do-
15.	Vishal Sood	UHF Nauni, HPSEDC	-do-
16.	Kush Patiyal	H.P. Polluction Control Board	-do-
17.	Shabbir Katoch	MC Palampur	-do-
18.	Ripu Daman Singh	MC Palampur/ HPMC/ HP Polluction Control Board.	-do-
19.	Sanjay Amtril Gopal.	SDM Palampur	-do-

20.	Arvind Sood	SDM Dehra	-do-
21.	Manu Bharti	Bhawarna/Chamunda Temple	-do-
22.	Ravinder Ranout, Palampur.	HP Forest Corporation	-do-
23.	Sushil Nag Palampur.	Him Urja/Forest Corporation	-do-
24.	Milap Chand Rana	Nagar Parishad	-do-
25.	Sanjeev Paddiar	HRTC	-do-
		Baijnath Court	
1.	Sanjay Goswami	HPSEB/KCC Bank	-do-
2.	Santosh Sharma	MC Baijnath/SDM B/Nath	-do-
3.	Vijay Kumar	HPPOL/HRTC	-do-
4.	Lakesh Sharma	HPTCL	-do-
5.	Rajesh Verma	Tehsil Office B/Nath	-do-
6.	Rakesh Kumar	Tehsildar/Naib. Tehsildar Baijnath	-do-
7.	Neeru Vij	HP Civil Supplies Corpn.	-do-
8.	Vinod K. Sajwel	HP Forest Corporation	-do-
9.	Vijay Kumar Makkar	HP Forest Corporation	-do-
		Dehra Court	
1.	Abhishek Padha	HRTC, KCC Bank, NP Jawalamukhi & SDM J/Mukhi.	-do-
2.	Arvind Dhiman	KCC Bank & H.P. Civil Supplies Corpn.	-do-
3.	Nitin Thakur	SC, ST, Corpn., Him Fed/MC Dehra	-do-
4.	Rajdeep Chauhan	SDM Dehra	-do-
5.	Arvind Kumar Sharma.	SDM Dehra	-do-
6.	Ajay Thakur	KCC Bank	-do-
7.	Amit Rana	Jawalamukhi Temple Trust	-do-
8.	Arvind Prabhakar	Pollution Control Board	-do-
9.	Bhavnesh Prashar	H.P. State Edu. Board	-do-
10.	Atul Rajyal	SDM Jawalamukhi	-do-
11.	Rajnath Bhatia	HPSEBL	-do-
12.	Amit Rana	Dehra	-do-
		Dharamshala Court	
1.	Anand Sharma	HPSEB/NHAI	-do-
2.	Arvind Kumar	H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC Bank/NHAI	-do-
3.	Varun Sharma	CSKAU Palampur/HPFC for HPAT	-do-
4.	Sumesh Raj Dogra	HRTC/HPSSC	-do-

5.	Tarun Sharma	Division Commissioner	-do-
6.	Madan Thakur	HPU/HPTU	-do-
7.	Umesh Dhiman	KCC Bank	-do-
8.	Aman Kapoor	HPMC	-do-
9.	Manish Chaudhary	Him Urja	-do-
10.	Vinod Kumar	DC & Tehsil Office	-do-
11.	Surinder Kaundal	H.P. Road and other Infrastructure	-do-
12.	Munish Kumar	UHF Nauni	-do-
13.	Sarita Chaudhary	H.P. Women & Child Welfare	-do-
14.	Latika Thakur	Wool Federation	-do-
15.	Ishant Guleria	H.P. Road and other Infrastructure	-do-
16.	Bobby Maratha	HPU(Regional Centre)	-do-
17.	Tevich Sanghoi	Land Mortgage Bank	-do-
18.	Ajay Thakur	H.P. Milk Federation	-do-
19.	Sandeep Kumar	Tehsil Office Dharamshala	-do-
20.	Sanjeev Sundhu	Tehsil Offie Dharamshala	-do-
21.	Manohar Thakur	HP GIC	-do-
22.	Rahul Sharma	MC D/Shala, KCC Bank	-do-
23.	Sudarshna	KCC Bank	-do-
24.	Narayan Thakur	H.P. Edu. Board	-do-
25.	Vivek Vashisth	Him Fed	-do-
26.	KS Thakur	Him Fed	-do-
27.	Mohit Sharma	KCC Bank	-do-
28.	Rakesh Mehra	HPFC	-do-
29.	Vishav Chakshu Puri.	MC D/Shala	-do-
30.	Rohit Planchkarn	KCC Bank	-do-
31.	Rajeev Azad	OBC Commission	-do-
32.	Chander Bhanu	MC Dharamshala	-do-
33.	Vishal Avasthi	KCC Bank	-do-
34.	Manoj Rana	KCC Bank	-do-
35.	Shisher Attri	SDM Shahpur/Indora	-do-
36.	Sanjeev Kumar	H.P. Public Service Commission Shimla	-do-
37.	Vishal Sharma	SDM D/Shala	-do-
38.	Rajender Chaudhary.	SDM Nagrota Bagwan	-do-
39.	Ravinder Chaudhary	Chamunda Temple	-do-
40.	Jaswinder Kaur	State Handicraft and Handloom Corporation.	-do-

41.	Himali Thapa	Khadi Board	-do-
42.	Rakesh Mehra, Dharamshala.	District Court(Revenue Court)	-do-
43.	Deepak Dogra	Session Court (Revenue cases)	-do-
44.	Ram Lal Narayan	District Court (Revenue cases), Forest Corporation.	-do-
45.	Shirish Bassi	KCC Bank	-do-
Kangra Court			
1.	Vipin Kumar	HPSEBL	-do-
2.	Anuj Gupta	HRTC	-do-
3.	Suresh Dhiman	State Civil Supplies Corpn.	-do-
4.	Vijay Gupta	Tehsildar/SDM Kangra	-do-
5.	Tarun Sharma	H.P. Forest Corpn.	-do-
6.	Suneet Kohli	NP Kangra/Temple Brajeshwari	-do-
Jawali Court			
1.	Prittam Singh Rana	KCC Bank/HRTC/HPSEB/HPFC	-do-
2.	Kalpana Thakur	Distt. Court Jawali, HPU	-do-
3.	Gurnam Singh Bharti	State Civil Supplies Corpn, OBC Commission, Sub Tehsil Nagrota Surian.	-do-
4.	Surinder Guleria	H.P. Edu.Board	-do-
5.	Tilak Repotra	NP Jawali, HRTC	-do-
6.	Basant Lal Sood	H..P Edu. Board	-do-
Dharamshala HP Administrative Tribunal Bench			
1.	Anand Sharma	MC D/Shala	-do-
2.	Arvind Kumar	H.P. State Civil Supply/HPFC, KCC Bank.	-do-
3.	Varun Sharma	CSKAU Palampur	-do-
4.	Sumesh Raj Dogra	HRTC/HPSSC/HPPSC	-do-
5.	Rohit Dutta	H.P. Electricity Board	-do-
6.	Arvind Vashist	NP P/pur, B/Nath, Nagrota, HPSEB	-do-
7.	Madan Thakur	HPU/HPTU	-do-
8.	Umesh Dhiman	KCC Bank, NP Kangra/Jawalamukhi/ Dehra.	-do-
9.	Aman Kapoor	H.P. MC	-do-
10.	Manish Chaudhary	Him Urja	-do-
11.	Surinder Kaundal	H.P. Road and other Infrastructure	-do-
12.	Munish Kumar	UHF Nauni	-do-
13.	Sarita Chaudhary	H.P. Women & Child Welfare	-do-
14.	Latika Thakur	Wool Federation	-do-
15.	Ishant Guleria	H.P. Road and other Infrastructure/all RKS Kangra & P/pur	-do-

16.	Bobby Maratha	HPU/Chamunda Temple Trust	-do-
17.	Taviech Sanghoi	Land Mortgage Bank	-do-
18.	Ajay Thakur	HP Milk Fed	-do-
19.	Manohar Thakur	HP GIC	-do-
20.	Rahul Sharma	NP Jawali/Nurpur & Him Fed, KCC Bank.	-do-
21.	Sudarshna	KCC Bank	-do-
22.	Narayan Thakur	H.P. Edu. Board	-do-
23.	Vivek Vashisth	HPFC	-do-

This engagement is purely at the pleasure of the State Government and can be withdrawn at any stage without assigning any reasons thereof.

The Deputy Commissioner is requested that whenever there is a need of service of any Advocate in the Revenue cases pertaining to the State, he may engage Advocate from the aforesaid panel. Further where more than one Advocate is empanelled for the same Revenue Court, the Deputy Commissioner will distribute the cases in rotation.

The expression "Revenue Cases" shall include all matters/proceedings relating to encroachment cases, correction cases or any other case where interest of the State Government is required to be protected before the Court.

By order,
Sd/-
LR-cum-*Pr. Secretary (Law).*

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-171002, the 10th July, 2018

No. PBW(B)F(7)3/2009-II.—In continuation of this department's notification of even number dated 14th May, 2018, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to declare the 'Pallingi to Nichar via Gramang' road in District Kinnaur having a length of 21.200 kms as Major District Road no. 97 at Sl. No. 88. Accordingly the total length of Major District Roads in District Kinnaur will be 21.200 km and in the State will be 4152.570 kms.

Sd/-
(MANISHA NANDA)
Addl. Chief Secretary (PW).

LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

D/Shala, the 02nd *November,* 2017

No. Shram (A) 6-2/2014 (Awards).—In exercise of the powers vested under Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, the Governor Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the publication of awards of the following cases announced by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court D/Shala on the website of the Department of Labour & Employment Government of Himachal Pradesh:—

Sl. No.	Ref. No.	Petitioner	Respondent	Date of Award/Order
1.	370/15	Sanjeet Kumar	D.F.O. Palampur	05-09-2017
2.	173/14	Subhash Chand	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
3.	176/14	Sudershan Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
4.	178/14	Ramesh Chand	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
5.	198/14	Vinod Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
6.	218/14	Madan Lal	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
7.	190/14	Kuldeep Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
8.	207/14	Ashok Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
9.	210/14	Vipan Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
10.	212/14	Punnu Ram	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
11.	217/14	Ashok Kumar	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	08-09-2017
12	690/16	Rama Sharma	Chairman, State Social Welfare Board	11-09-2017
13.	576/15	Dhani Ram	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
14.	573/15	Gian Chand	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
15.	532/15	Devi Singh	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
16.	531/15	Dharam Pal	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
17.	569/15	Gurdev	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
18.	562/15	Dhano	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
19.	575/15	Roop Dass	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
20.	524/15	Khem Ram	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
21.	20/16	Tul Dei	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
22.	508/15	Des Raj	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
23.	568/15	Kishan Dei	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
24.	451/15	Chandro	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
25.	529/15	Janam Singh	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
26.	578/15	Yuvraj	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
27.	574/15	Devi Singh	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017

28.	521/15	Sarita	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
29.	522/15	Suman Kumari	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
30.	581/15	Dhuri Devi	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
31.	526/15	Amar Dei	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
32.	558/15	Basant Singh	E.E. HPPWD/I&PH, Killar	18-09-2017
33.	109/17	Dinesh Singh	Registrar CSK, HPKVV Palampur	23-09-2017
34.	103/15	Kaman Singh	E.E. HPPWD, Killar	04-09-2017
35.	155/15	Bhag Chand	E.E. HPPWD, Killar	04-09-2017
36.	377/15	Abdul Sitar	Dy. Director Horticulture	20-09-2017
37.	378/15	Kirpa Ram	Dy. Director Horticulture	20-09-2017

By order,

R. D. DHIMAN, IAS
Pr. Secretary (Lab. & Emp.).

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 370/ 2015

Shri Sanjeet Kumar s/o Shri Pritam Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Chachian, Tehsil Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division Palampur, Distt. Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy.D.A. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

05-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A. for the respondent.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action /publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
05-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 173/ 2014

Shri Subhash Chand s/o Sh. Hari Krishan, r/o V.P.O. Parour, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.33 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K. Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present:None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.36 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 176/ 2014

Shri Sudershan Kumar, s/o Shri Partap Chand, r/o Village Toran, P.O. Tikkar, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.32 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

(K. K.SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 178/ 2014

Shri Ramesh Chand s/o Sh. Kirpa Ram, r/o Village Ram Nagar, P.O. Tathail, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

(K. K.SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.35 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. Authorised Representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 198/ 2014

Shri Vinod Kumar s/o Shri Amar Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Arla, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.34 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.37 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref : No. 218/ 2014

Shri Madan Lal s/o Shri Rajinder Kumar, r/o V.P.O. Ustehar, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.35 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.38 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 190/ 2014

Shri Kuldeep Kumar s/o Sh. Jodha Ram, r/o Village-Dargil, P.O. Deogran, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.36 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.39 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref: No. 207/ 2014

Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Shri Tara Chand, r/o Village Bhatpura, P.O. Thandol, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.38 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.41 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM- **INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref: No. 210/ 2014

Shri Vipan Kumar s/o Shri Malaha Singh, r/o V.P.O. Massal Tehsil & District Kangra, H.P.
. .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.40 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, Adv. Csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.42 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No. 212/ 2014

Shri Punnu Ram s/o Shri Gatto Ram, r/o V.P.O. Jhikli Bheth, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.42 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.

Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.43 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref.: No. 217/ 2014

Shri Ashok Kumar s/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o V.P.O. Dadh (Takka Khater), Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Vice Chancellor/Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV) Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due knowledge. It is 11.44 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

08-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondent

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.44 P.M. None appearance of petitioner or his ld. authorised representative today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs.

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
08-09-2017

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 690/2016

Date of Institution : 03-10-2016

Date of Decision : 11-9-2017

Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi Sharma, r/o Ward No.3, Village and Post Office Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

1. The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2

2. The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondents.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

ORDER/AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the termination of the services of Smt. Rama Sharma d/o Smt. Subhadra Devi Sharma, r/o Ward No.-3, Village and P.O. Old Kangra, Tehsil and District Kangra, H.P. by the (1) The Chairman, State Social Welfare Board, Thakur Vatika Khalini, Shimla-2 (2) The Chairperson, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Near Purani Chungi, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. during September, 2014 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and amount of compensation the above aggrieved worker is entitled to from the above employers/Management?"

11.9.2017 Present: Miss Sarita Chaudhary, Adv. with petitioner Smt. Rama Sharma.

Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. in person.

Smt. Shail Bharti and Smt. Latika Thakur, Adv. Csl. for the respondents.

Case taken up for conciliation as a result of which parties have amicably resolved their dispute *qua* present reference no.690/2016.

2. Smt. Rajni Vyas, Chairperson/President, Family and Child Welfare Project Society, Rait, Tehsil Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P. has testified on oath to have entered into compromise with petitioner according to which petitioner would be appointed as teacher on monthly salary of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) per month **within a month after sanction from government**. She has further stated that a sum of Rs. 22,000/- being arrears of salary from February 2014 to August, 2014 is to be paid to the petitioner/claimant out of which first installment of Rs. 11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) has been paid to the claimant/petitioner today *vide* cheque No.057303 and remaining amount of Rs.11,000/ (Rupees eleven thousand only) would be paid to her before 31st October, 2017. Admitting correctness of statement of respondent No.2 aforestated, petitioner/claimant has prayed for disposal of claim petition. She has further acknowledged to have received a cheque of Rs.11,000/- (Rupees eleven thousand only) *i.e.* first installment from respondent No. 2 today in the Court. In view of the separate statement made by both the parties, this reference is disposed as compromised. The parties shall however be bound by their statement recorded today.

3. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

4. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

5. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open Court today this 11th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 576/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 06-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Dhani Ram s/o Shri Ram Saran, r/o Village Kulal, P.O. Mindhal, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash

Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dhani Ram in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer,

HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 06.12.2011 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . OPP.

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

ISSUES NO.1 TO 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident

from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1995.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 58 days in the year 1996, 59 days in 1997, 186 days in 1998, 145 days in 1999, 89 days in 2000, 121.5 days in 2001, 89 days in 2002, 127 days in 2003 and 103 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 977.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 103 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he

had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute** ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra*. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its

power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra***.**

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing *Cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make

a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief ".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he have lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon**

Machenize's case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and actually worked for 977.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 06.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room. Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 573/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gian Chand s/o Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2001 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Gian Chand S/O Shri Labh Singh, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2001, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil, District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed

in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gian Chand in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2001 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2001 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the

evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 25.01.2012 *qua* his termination of service during September, 2001 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2001 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.80,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from

1996 till 2001 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged till the year 2001 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 165.5 days in the year 1996, 122 days in 1997, 111 days in 1998, 123 days in 1999, 132 days in 2000 and 121 days in 2001 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2001 in 06 years he had worked for 774.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 to 2001 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2001 the petitioner had merely worked for 121 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2001, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State

has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon

Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*Cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer and the State Government to

make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2001 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had completed 240 days in calender year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant- employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important** circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the

facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked for 774.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2001 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eleven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 80,000/- (Rupees eighty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 532/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during October, 2002 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Sukh Dayal, r/o Village and Post Office Mouch, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2002, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage Beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2002 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who

appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Devi Singh in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2002 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2002. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2002 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2002 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2002 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2002 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in *lieu* thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex.

PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 *qua* his termination of service during October, 2002 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October, 2002 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2002 with the respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the

reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2002. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2002 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2002. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 177 days in the year 1996, 166 days in 1997 170 days in 1998, 150 days in 1999, 125 days in 2000, 133 days in 2001 and 125 days in 2002 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2002 in 07 years he had worked for 1046 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that

except the years 1999 to 2002 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2002 the petitioner had merely worked for 125 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in October, 2002, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been

working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*Cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2002 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief.**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon"ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC** supra, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 1046 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2002 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **nine years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 531/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H/H.P.P.W.D. Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Dharampal s/o Shri Charan Dass, r/o Village and Post Office Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Engineer, I.&P.H./ H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous service' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dharam Pal in 2004. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained

unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in *lieu* thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1	: Discussed
Issue No. 2	: Yes
Issue No. 3	: Discussed
Issue No. 4	: No
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged Beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1996 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1996 to 2004 and not for 1996 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for

relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 82.5 days in the year 1996, 140 days in 1997, 160 days in 1998, 140 days in 1999, 106 days in 2000, 116 days in 2001, 111 in 2002, and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 963.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner

had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M.**

Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765 in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon"ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum**-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In *lieu* of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC *supra,*** claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually worked for 963.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 569/2015

Date of Institution : 04.12.2015

Date of Decision : 18.9.2017

Shri Gurudev w/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Gurudev s/o Shri Deena Nath, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1993 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him

and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1993 to 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2003 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, Copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 25.01.2012 *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1	: Discussed
Issue No. 2	: Yes
Issue No. 3	: Discussed
Issue No. 4	: No
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1993 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1994 to 2004 and not from 1993 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on

record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1993 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 31 days in the year 1994, 138 days in 1995, 137 days in 1996, 30 days in 1997, 119 days in 1998, 108 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000, 117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 112 days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 1140.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to

alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co- workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had

held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a

delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon"ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had completed 240 days in celendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief"**.

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC *supra,*** claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1140.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eight years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 562/2015

Date of Institution : 04.12.2015

Date of Decision : 18.9.2017

Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 28-05-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during October, 1997 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Dhano s/o Shri Man Singh, r/o Village Kuthah, P.O. Dharwas, Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 1997, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok Chand in 2002, and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner

also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and as per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 1997 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1997 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 28.5.2012 *qua* his termination of service during October, 1997 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP*.

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October, 1997 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP*.

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .OPP.

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1: : Discussed

Issue No. 2 : : Yes

Issue No. 3: : Discussed

Issue No. 4: : No

Relief: : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.35,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1991 till 1997 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged till 1997 and not upto 2004. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub-Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 90 days in the year 1991, 47 days in 1993, 31 days in 1994, 10 days in 1995, 20 days in 1996 and 80 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 1997 in 06 years he had worked for 278 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1997 the petitioner had merely worked for 80 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 1997 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 06 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in October, 1997, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's**

case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.
>
> **14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S. M. Nilajkar & Ors.** v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
>
> "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the

employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, Labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed

by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1997 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon"ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be

based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important

aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked for 278 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 1997 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **fifteen years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 28.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)**

Ref. No. : 575/2015

Date of Institution : 04-12-2015

Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 25-01-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of services of Shri Roop Dass s/o Shri Mangal Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Gurdev in 1994. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been

afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para no.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, copy of Notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 25.01.2012 qua his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1	: Discussed
Issue No. 2	: Yes
Issue No. 3	: Discussed
Issue No. 4	: No
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1997 till 2004 and not from 1994 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim

of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 81 days in the year 1997, 169 days in 1998, 106 days in 1999, 146 days in 2000, 117.5 days in 2001, 120 days in 2002, 142 days in 2003 and 104 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years he had worked for 985.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997 and 1999 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal

termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 104 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North**

East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the

Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the

criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

> 17. **Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court.** Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement

of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 (3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373**

titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually worked for 985.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **7½ years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 25.01.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of

observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 524/2015

Date of Institution : 21-11-2015

Date of Decision : 18-09-2017

Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of services of Shri Khem Ram s/o Shri Sant Ram, r/o Village Kironi Mouch, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Tek Chand who appointed in 1999, Baldev in 2000, Trilok Chand in 2002 and Hari Ram in 2003. The claimant/ petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2004 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1991 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he

would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . . *OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . . *OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . . *OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1	: Discussed
Issue No. 2	: Yes
Issue No. 3	: Discussed
Issue No. 4	: No
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1991 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 58 days in the year 1991, 154 days in 1992, 25 days in 1994, 121 days in 1999, 148 days in 2000, 119 days in 2001, 169 days in 2002, 156 days in 2003 and 119 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1991 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1069 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1991, 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 119 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1991 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the

petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

16. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6

years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not

be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and actually worked for 1069 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the

Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,20,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 20/2016
Date of Institution : 20-1-2016
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . . *Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the termination of services of Smt. Tul Dei w/o Shri Shiv Dass, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view the delay of more than 7 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1995 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act

while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996, Balwant in 1996, Prakash Chand in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1995 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2003 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para no. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 19.12.2016 for determination:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by respondent during August, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

4. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on the part of petitioner as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief:

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Yes

Issue No.2 : Discussed

Issue No.3 : No

Issue No.4 : Discussed

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.90,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1997 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1995 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1997 to 2004 and not from 1995 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1995 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 102 days in the year 1997, 59 days in 1998, 156 days in 1999, 129 days in 2000, 45 days in 2001, 117 days in 2002, 122 days in 2003 and 82 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1997 to 2004 in 08 years she had worked for 812 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 82 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 19.11.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for

regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or latches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon"ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually worked for 812 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eight years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 25.3.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3:

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.90,000/- (Rupees ninety thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 508/2015
Date of Institution : 09-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 30-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during year, 2000 suffers from delay and laches? If not, whether termination of services of Shri Des Raj s/o Shri Shiv Lal, r/o Village Bishthow, P.O. Luj, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2000, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1984 who continuously worked till 2000 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is

contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Chunku Ram in 2000, Budhi Ram in 2003, and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2001 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2000. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2000 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1984 to 2000 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.1994 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2000 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2000 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/B, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/C, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/D1 and D2 and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 29.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 30.12.2011 *qua* his termination of service during year, 2000 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year, 2000 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief:

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1996 till 2000 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1984 to 2000. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1996 and not in 1984. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1984 to 2000. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in 2000 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This prima facie belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in

between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 22 days in the year 1996, 36 days in 1997, 184 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999 and 60 days in 2000 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2000 in 05 years he had worked for 439 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2000 the petitioner had merely worked for 60 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2000 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 27.8.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such,

it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2000, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*) 1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. **Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court.** Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2000 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important** circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and actually worked for 439 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2000 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eleven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 30.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble

High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref . No. : 568/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I&PH Killar (Pangi) District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 28-02-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during October, 2003 suffers from delay and latches? If not, whether termination of services of Smt. Kishan Dei w/o Shri Naveen Kumar d/o Shri Madho Lal, r/o Village Thandal, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during October, 2003, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment

compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2005 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/ proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated nil received on 28.2.2012 qua her termination of service during October, 2003 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October, 2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1998 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1997 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1998 to 2003 and not from 1997 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 26 days in the year 1998, 26 days in 1999, 11 days in 2000, 53.5 days in 2001, 27 days in 2002 and 29 days in 2003 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to 2003 in 06 years she had worked for 172.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 29 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1998 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no iota of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2003 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 05 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in October, 2003, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 supra), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the Learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (supra)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court). In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. **Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court.** Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon"ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief.**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner

cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/ petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked for 172.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **8 ½ years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 28.2.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** supra, claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the above said reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4:

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 451/2015
Date of Institution : 29-10-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I&PH/HPPWD Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 02.02.2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during October 2005 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt. Chandro w/o Shri Baldev, r/o Village Kuthal, P.O. Sach, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during October 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had

terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 along with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2004 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/B, copy of order dated 27.8.15 Ex. PW1/C and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 2.2.2012 *qua* her termination of service during October, 2005 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during October, 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25- F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks

had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 105 days in the year 1996, 168 days in 1997, 170 days in 1998, 149 days in 1999, 80 days in 2000, 111 days in 2001, 96 days in 2002, 107 days in 2003, 106 days in 2004 and 73 days in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 1996 to 2005 in 10 years she had worked for 1165 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 and 1999 to 2005 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 73 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 26.8.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in October, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. **In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *v.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calander year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied

relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 1165 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 02.02.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been

challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees one lakh thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 529/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D., Division Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated-nil-received on 15.05.2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Janam Singh s/o Shri Moti Ram, r/o Village Kawas, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2003 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that

respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had reengaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Suraj Ram who appointed in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003, Janam Singh in 2004 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2003 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2003. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2003 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2003 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2005 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged Beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated nil *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1 : Discussed

Issue No. 2 : Yes

Issue No. 3 : Discussed

Issue No. 4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1996 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making

correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 84 days in the year 1996, 135 days in 1997, 116 days in 1998, 115 days in 1999, 115 days in 2000, 114 days in 2001, 164 days in 2002, 108 days in 2003 and 109 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2004 in 09 years he had worked for 1060 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1996 to 2001 and 2003 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 109 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.09.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against

respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to

make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon"ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing- cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ workman 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para no.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** vs. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that

Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and actually worked for 1060 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eight years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 15.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- (Rupees one lakh ten thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 578/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-09-2017

Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 25-03-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during August, 2003, suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of worker Shri Yuvraj s/o Shri Tika Ram, r/o Village Shour, P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2003, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1996 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation

was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Sher Singh who appointed in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003 and Dev Raj in 2007. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2004 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 2003 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2003 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 25.03.2012 *qua* his termination of service during August, 2003 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August, 2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1	: Discussed
Issue No.2	: Yes
Issue No.3	: Discussed
Issue No.4	: No
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1996 till 2003 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1996 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged till 2003 and not upto October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1996 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner,

on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 166 days in the year 1996, 172 days in 1997, 148 days in 1998, 137 days in 1999, 109 days in 2000, 83 days in 2001, 85 days in 2002 and 97 days in 2003 and thus a total of his service in 1996 to 2003 in 08 years he had worked for 997 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1998 to 2003 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2003 the petitioner had merely worked for 119 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2001 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him

for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** vs. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs. 1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 08 years and actually worked for 997 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **nine years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 25.3.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged

on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (HP)

Ref. No. : 574/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o VPO Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Shri Devi Singh s/o Shri Duni Chand, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.&P.H. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1998 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/ department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing

one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Jai Dass who appointed in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001, Budhi Ram in 2003, Devi Singh in 2004, Sher singh in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2003. The claimant/ petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1998 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2006 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his

termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D, copy of notice Ex. PW1/E and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D. A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated nil *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief.

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 To 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1998 continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1998 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that

petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 82 days in 1999, 45 days in 2000, 90.5 days in 2001, 113 days in 2002, 110 days in 2003 and 88 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1998 to 2004 in 07 years he had worked for 556.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 88 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 16.04.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The

appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in

the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-

Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** vs. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably

indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 556.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eight years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 08.5.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be

attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainble could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)**

Ref. No. : 521/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P.
. .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P.
. .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 03-04-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 1998 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of Ms. Sarita d/o Shri Kewal Ram, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 1998, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's

notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2003 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1996 who remained engaged till 1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/ proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 16.2.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 3.4.2012 *qua* her termination of service during August, 1998 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August, 1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief:

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.30,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1996 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged *w.e.f.* 1996 to 1998 and not from 1994 to October, 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The

petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 125 days in the year 1996, 106 days in 1997 and 61 days in 1998 and thus a total of her service in 1996 to 1998 in 03 years she had worked for 292 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 61 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 1998 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1996 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its

accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August, 1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross- examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon"ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra*, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.

The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon"ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon"ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and actually worked for 292 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **fourteen years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 03.04.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex

Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 522/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, HPPWD, Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 13-06-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during September, 1998 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Ms. Suman Kumari d/o Shri Mahatam Chand, r/o Village Kuffa, P.O. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 1998, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1992 who continuously worked till October, 1998 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that

respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 1998 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 1998. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 1998 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1992 to October, 1998 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 1998 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 1998 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 13.6.2012 *qua* her termination of service during September, 1998 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 1998 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief:

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief. : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.60,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1994 till 1998 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1992 to October, 1998. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1994 and not in 1992.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1992 to October, 1998. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 1998 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 49 ½ days in the year 1994, 135 ½ days in 1995, 196 days in 1996, 153 days in 1997 and 123 days in 1998 and thus a total of her service in 1994 to 1998 in 05 years she had worked for 657 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 1998 the petitioner had merely worked for 123 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/C the order dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner

is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 04 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in September, 1998, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour

Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can

appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 1998 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-** cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** vs. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which

provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 05 years and actually worked for 657 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 1998 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **fourteen years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 13.06.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the

basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4:

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 581/2015
Date of Institution : 04.12.2015
Date of Decision : 18.9.2017

Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated nil received in the Labour Office Chamba on dated 08-05-2012 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during August, 2005 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt. Dhuri Devi w/o Shri Devi Singh, r/o V.P.O. Purthi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during August, 2005 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 2000 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/ disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no

retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Prakash Chand who appointed in 2001, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 along-with back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1996 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2008 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply inter-alia taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 2003 who remained engaged till 2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated nil *qua* her termination of service during August, 2005 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during August, 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue no. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .OPR.

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No. 1 : Discussed

Issue No. 2 : Yes

Issue No. 3 : Discussed

Issue No. 4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.40,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 2003 till 2005 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 2000 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 2003 and not in 2000.

Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages along-with seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 2000 to October, 2005. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand

taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 122 days in the year 2003, 91 days in 2004 and 75 days in 2005 and thus a total of her service in 2003 to 2005 in 03 years she had worked for 288 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 75 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 2000 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after August, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 2003 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 01.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 08 years which entitled her

for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in August, 2005, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days

during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% p.a. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** vs. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the

court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 03 years and actually worked for 288 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in August, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 08.05.2012. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the

ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 526/2015
Date of Institution : 21-11-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . . *Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 regarding her alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Smt. Amar Dei w/o Shri Thakur Chand, r/o Village Sagli, P.O. Kothi, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, I.&P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that she had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1991 who continuously worked till October, 2004 with the respondent. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/

department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, she had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Chuni Lal who appointed in 1997, Tek Chand in 1999, Bhag Dei in 2000, Ram Dei in 2003, Dev Raj in 2004, Bameshwar Dutt in 2011 and Raj Kumar in 2011. The claimant/petitioner claimed that she had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or her conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon her and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that she has remained unemployed ever since her illegal termination from month of October, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2004. She further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of her illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1991 to October, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2001 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1998 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at her own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at her own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of her own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 she would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no

necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after her termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated her stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove her case, petitioner had examined herself as PW1 tendered/ proved her affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D.R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 20.4.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 06.10.2011 *qua* her termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.70,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of her own and used to work intermittently as per her own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1998 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1991 to October, 2004. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged in the year 1998 and not in 1991. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming her pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In her affidavit she has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1991 to October, 2004. She has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating her service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to her and thus her termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating her services in October, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that she had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against her but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from her duty as also reflected in mandays chart

Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever she absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that she used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather she has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to her by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 28 days in the year 1998, 55 ½ days in 1999, 104 days in 2000, 57 days in 2001, 119 days in 2002, 126 days in 2003 and 108 days in 2004 and thus a total of her service in 1998 to 2004 in 07 years she had worked for 597.5 days in her entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 108 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. Some of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were re-engaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1998 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 22.9.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders *qua* termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 07 years which entitled her for regularization of her service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in September, 2004, she had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that she had cultivable land with her and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which she had maintained that she had been earning from agricultural land as well as she has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from her agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain her and her family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, she cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for her livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after her retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period she was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. **Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows-

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against her and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from her employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date she raised the demand regarding her illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of her acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that she would be reinstated after her acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which she approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-** cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labaur Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act- Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an import**ant circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to her credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when she has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University,**

Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 07 years and actually worked for 597.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 06.10.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as

Raghubir Singh's case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues no. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief:

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 558/2015
Date of Institution : 04-12-2015
Date of Decision : 18-9-2017

Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o VPO Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D./ I.&P.H., Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. . . *Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. O.P. Bhardwaj, Adv.
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o V.P.O. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 08-12-2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services during September, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of services of worker Shri Basant Singh s/o Shri Puran Chand, r/o V.P.P. Kumar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, I.P.H./ H.P.P.W.D. Killar (Pangi), District Chamba, H.P. during September, 2004, without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

3. Brief facts as enumerated in the present claim petition by the petitioner above named revealed that he had been initially engaged as daily wage beldar on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent. Averments made in

the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as the criteria prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had been interrupted by way of intermittent/ artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as 'continuous services' for the purposes of calculation of 160 days for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service orally without issuing one month's notice in writing indicating the reason for retrenchment besides no retrenchment compensation was paid to petitioner when respondent had been illegally terminated. It is contended that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act while disengaging the services of petitioner. It is stated that petitioner is very poor and no source of income besides after termination of the services of petitioner, he had approached the respondent time and again but of no avail. The grievance of petitioner further remains that when the services of petitioner have been terminated, respondent/department had re-engaged number of new workman from time to time and respondent had not followed the principle of 'Last come, First go' envisaged under Section 25-G of the Act. It is further alleged that respondent/department had continuously retained junior to petitioner who are still in service namely Gurdev who appointed in 1994, Sher Singh in 1996, Suraj Ram in 1997, Jai Dass in 1998, Tek Chand in 1999, Chunku Ram in 2000, Prakash Chand in 2001 and Budhi Ram in 2003. The claimant/petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination in the year 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/retrenchment by the respondent in the year 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service in the year 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2002 having completed 10 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to law settled by Hon'ble High Court of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

4. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned in para No. 10 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and no other juniors to the petitioner had been retained in service by the respondent. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required.

Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.10 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala and respondent had not violated the principle of 'Last come, First go'. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004 he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after seven years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

6. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/ proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, copy of seniority list Ex. PW1/B, copy of demand notice dated Ex. PW1/C, copy of order of Hon'ble High Court Ex. PW1/D and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri D. R. Chauhan, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C and closed the evidence.

7. I have heard the ld. Counsel of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 18.5.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 08.12.2011 *qua* his termination of service during September, 2004 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

9. For the reasons detailed here under, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,25,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1 to 3 :

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. However, there is dispute with regard to period for which the petitioner has worked with respondent. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B coupled with pleadings of respondent that petitioner had worked from 1994 till 2004 whereas the claimant/petitioner alleges that he had worked from 1994 to October, 2005. Since the claim of petitioner is not substantiated from any corresponding documentary evidence on record, the only inference in such situation could be drawn is that petitioner had been factually engaged till 2004 and not upto 2005. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

12. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal, as there existed no road between Chamba town to Pangi Tehsil till 2011 and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

13. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner whenever he absented from duty. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermit breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

14. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 61 days in the year 1994, 146.5 days in 1995, 27.5 days in 1996, 118 days in 1997, 111 days in 1998, 53 days in 1999, 77 days in 2000, 118 days in 2001, 125 days in 2002 and 105 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 10 years he had worked for 942 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that petitioner had not worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2004 the petitioner had merely worked for 105 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

15. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. RW1/C is the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1997 or thereafter. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. RW1/C the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. RW1/C also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No. 10 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

16. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent has made futile attempt to justify engagement junior worker and their retention in service in pursuance to Awards passed by Labour Court. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for petitioner relied upon Ex. PW1/D the order dated 05.10.2015 of Hon'ble High Court of H.P. *vide* which the orders qua termination passed as against respondent and several other were quashed. That being so the relief was granted in favour of the petitioner who was directed to be reinstated with others. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 10 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability for complying the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such, it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. Ld. Counsel for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that **'term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the

2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. *vs.* **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Court held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment has certainly not been correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrate in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor,**

Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation. Since the facts of case of **Mackinon Machenize's** case are different from case in hand as in former closure of unit of company was involved whereas in case in hand before this court, there is no closure of company rather it is the department of HPPWD which had engaged petitioner without following of the procedure although subject to funds and availability of work. As such, when there is no closure of any unit by respondent which the petitioner was engaged, judgment of **Mackinon Machenize** cannot be made applicable.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 supra) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 10 years and actually worked for 942 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **seven years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 08.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court

in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs. 1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,25,000/- (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 18th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT- CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)**

Ref. No. 109/ 2017

Shri Dinesh Singh s/o Sh. Chatter Singh, r/o Village Agoger, P.O. Andreta, Tehsil Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

1. The Vice Chancellor, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P.

2. The Registrar, Chaudhary Sarwan Kumar Himachal Pradesh Krishi Vishav Vidyalya (CSKHPKV), Palampur District Kangra, H.P. . .*Respondents.*

23-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.

Case called several times but none has appeared on behalf of the petitioner despite due service. It is 11.30 A.M. Be awaited and put up after lunch hours.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial*
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

23-09-2017 Present: None for the petitioner.
Smt. Rajni Katoch, adv. csl. for the respondents.

Case has been called again several times but none has appeared on behalf of petitioner. It is 2.30 P.M. None appearance of petitioner today is indicative of the fact that he is not interested to pursue present reference and accordingly reference is disposed of for non-prosecution.

Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. The parties to bear their own costs

Let copy of the Order/Award be sent to the appropriate Government for information and further necessary action / publication. The file, after completion be consigned to the records.

Announced:
23-09-2017

(K.K.Sharma)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-Industrial
Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K.K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 103/2015
Date of Institution : 04-3-2015
Date of Decision : 04-9-2017

Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsi Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service *w.e.f.* October, 2005 suffers from delay and latches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram, r/o Village and Post Office Shahli, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D. Division, Killar, District Chamba, H.P. *w.e.f.* 18.08.2010 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On 21st January, 2017 the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:

> "In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-02-2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Kaman Singh s/o Shri Daulat Ram may be read as 'October, 2005' instead of '18-08-2010', which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification".

3. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

4. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the month of June, 1997 who continuously worked till October, 2005 with the respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District

Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of October, 2005 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/ retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time, one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was *prima facie* illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/ petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of October, 2005 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of October, 2005. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of October, 2005 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1997 to October, 2005 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2005 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

5. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1997 who remained engaged till 2005 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 25 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial Nos. 26 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No. 4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial

Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2005, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

6. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

7. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri V.K. Dhiman the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

8. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

9. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 7.7.2015 and issue No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent *w.e.f.* October, 2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

4. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1	: Yes
Issue No.2	: Discussed
Issue No.3	: No
Issue No.4	: Discussed
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1997 who continuously worked till 2005 with the respondent/ department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1997 to October, 2005. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in October, 2005 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/ department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after October, 2005. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken

by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 132 days in the year 1997, 160 days in 1998, 157 days in 1999, 119 days in 2000, 174.5 days in 2001, 151.5 days in 2002, 96 days in 2003, 65.5 days in 2004 and 65 days in 2005 and thus a total of his service in 1997 to 2005 in 08 years he had worked for 1120 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002 to 2005 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co- workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join for service at any time after October, 2005 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1997 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for re-employment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders of Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as

reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/ petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in October, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant

factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra*.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it

cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. **Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court.** Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra*. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

20. Ld. Counsel representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute- Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 *supra* has referred to **Gitam Singh's** case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and actually worked for 1120 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in October, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **five years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 35 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter

of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** vs. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation *qua* facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA, PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA (H.P.)

Ref. No. : 155/2015
Date of Institution : 04-4-2015
Date of Decision : 04-9-2017

Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, Killar District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Dy. D.A.

AWARD

The reference given below has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. before the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 18.08.2010 regarding his alleged illegal termination of services *w.e.f.* August, 2004 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand, r/o Village and P.O. Rei, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. by the Executive Engineer, Killar Division, H.P.P.W.D. Killar, Tehsil Pangi, District Chamba, H.P. *w.e.f.* August, 2004 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On 9th February, 2017, the corrigendum had been received from the appropriate Government whereby the reference has been partly modified in the aforesaid terms:

"In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 24-02-2015, the date of termination of workman Shri Bhag Chand s/o Shri Laxmi Chand may be read as 'September, 2004' instead of 'August, 2004', which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification".

3. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim.

4. Brief facts leading to institution of the present claim petition by the petitioner above named reveal that he had been initially engaged as daily waged beldar on muster roll basis in the month of June, 1994 who continuously worked till September, 2004 with the respondent/department. Averments made in the petition further revealed that petitioner had worked for 160 days in each calendar year as prescribed for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil District Chamba and became eligible for continuous service envisaged under statutory provisions of Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). Averments made in the petition revealed that the services of petitioner had interrupted by way of intermittent/artificial breaks given by the respondent/department deliberately and as such breaks are required to be counted as continuous services for the purposes of calculation of 160 days so as for the applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. The grievance of petitioner remains that respondent/department had terminated/disengaged petitioner from daily wage service in the end of September, 2004 by an oral order without any reason whereas several other co-workers who were junior to petitioner had been retained on muster roll and thus the action of respondent/department was stated to be unjustified and malafide. It is alleged that seniority list of daily wage workers working under the respondent had not been circulated till termination/ retrenchment of the petitioner and while retrenching the services of petitioner, even principle of 'Last come First go' had not been followed by the department/respondent. The petitioner has named 27 persons who were junior to petitioner and joined service from 1st May, 1998 to 1st September, 2007. In the end of month of October, 2005 when the services of petitioner were terminated by way of oral order, he was not served with one month notice of retrenchment and at the same time, one month's wages in lieu of notice period had also not been paid to him and for said reason termination of the services of petitioner was *prima facie* illegal and unwarranted. The claimant/ petitioner claimed that he had spotless service record who never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline or negligence or his conduct and even at the time of verbal termination, no charge-sheet had been served upon him and the at the same time, no opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him. The petitioner also alleges that he has remained unemployed ever since his illegal termination from month of September, 2004 till the date of institution of present claim petition who had been nowhere gainfully employed and was thus entitled for full back wages. Accordingly alleging respondent to have committed violation of statutory provision of Section 25-F, Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Article 14 and 16 of Constitution of India, the petitioner prays for setting aside oral order of termination/ retrenchment by the respondent in the month of September, 2004. He further prayed for reinstatement in service *w.e.f.* month of September, 2004 alongwith back wages, seniority including continuity in service as petitioner has remained unemployed since the date of his illegal termination. The petitioner has also prayed that period of intermittent/fictional breaks given time and again during entire service of petitioner between 1994 to September, 2004 be counted 160 days continuous service and regularization of the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 01.01.2002 having completed 08 years of service and per the policy of HP Govt. in pursuance to judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as Rakesh Kumar *vs.* State of H.P. and to any other relief petitioner is entitled.

5. The respondent contested claim petition, filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections of maintainability, claim petition being bad on account of delay and laches. On

merits denied that petitioner had worked for more than 160 days in each calendar year rather clarified by stating that petitioner was engaged as daily waged beldar in 1994 who remained engaged till 2004 but had worked intermittently as petitioner used to come and attend the work at his own sweet will and convenience. Relying upon the mandays chart, it has been categorically pleaded by the respondent that petitioner had not completed 160 days in each calendar year as required for tribal area of Pangi Tehsil. Allegations of fictional breaks given by respondent to the petitioner have been denied. In so far as engagement of persons junior to petitioner mentioned at serial Nos. 1 to 24 and 26 in para No. 4 of the claim petition were appointed as per order of Labour Court and at serial Nos. 25 & 27 as harness case. On the plea of termination of service of petitioner, respondent specifically alleges that petitioner had left the job at his own will therefore serving of notice or pay in lieu thereof was not required. Reiterating its stand respondent has maintained that petitioner had left the work of his own sweet will and the persons mentioned in para No.4 are stated to have engaged as per direction of the Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal Dharamshala as harness case. It is also contended that if petitioner had been terminated in 2004, he would have definitely raised industrial dispute immediately and that after ten years petitioner is stated to be agitating the matter which is bad on account of delay and laches. It is also contended that since the services of petitioner had not been terminated by the respondent, question of issuance of notice or wages in lieu thereof did not arise and at the same time, there was no necessity for charge-sheet or issuing any notice of petitioner after his termination. It is contended that petitioner was agriculturist and gainfully employed and was thus not entitled for back wages.

6. The petitioner filed rejoinder, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition. Further asserted that provisions of Limitation Act did not eclipse the claim of petitioner in totality besides allegation of violation of principle of 'Last come First go' was specifically denied.

7. In order to prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit Ex. PW1/A under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/B to PW1/L mandays charts of junior workers and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by the petitioner, respondent examined RW1 Shri Pramod Upreti, the then Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division Killar as RW1 tendered/proved mandays chart of petitioner Ex. RW1/B, copy of mandays chart of workers Ex. RW1/C, Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 copy of orders/awards and closed the evidence.

8. I have heard the ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner and ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent, gone through records of the case carefully relevant for disposed of this case.

9. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 12.8.2015 and issue No.1 recasted and was framed on 01.09.2017 for determination which are as under:

1. Whether termination of services of the petitioner by the respondent *w.e.f.* September, 2004 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . . *OPP.*

2. If issue No.1 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . . *OPP.*

3. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . . *OPR.*

4. Whether the claim petition is bad on account of delay and laches on part of the petitioner as alleged. If so, its effect? . . *OPR.*

Relief :

10. For the reasons detailed hereunder, my findings on the above issues are as follows:—

Issue No.1	: Yes
Issue No.2	: Discussed
Issue No.3	: No
Issue No.4	: Discussed
Relief	: Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No.1, 2 and 4 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. Relationship of petitioner having been engaged as daily waged beldar by respondent on muster roll basis in the year 1994 who continuously worked till 2004 with the respondent/department is not in dispute. Admittedly, petitioner was engaged without any written order or settlement of terms and conditions by the respondent. It is equally not in dispute that no written order was passed while terminating service of the petitioner as claim of respondent remains that it had not retrenched petitioner from service who had abandoned the job of his own and used to work intermittently as per his own wish and convenience. Admittedly, the reference of appropriate govt. does not relate to plea of fictional breaks but only with regard to petitioner's termination from service. In the backdrop of foregoing admitted facts on record, claim of petitioner requires to be adjudicated with a view to determine if petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement and back wages alongwith seniority and past service benefits and compensation as claimed by him.

13. Stepping into witness box as PW1 has sworn in affidavit Ex. PW1/A reiterating and reaffirming his pleadings as stipulated in claim petition. In his affidavit he has claimed to have worked with the respondent/department for more than 160 days in Pangi Sub Division Chamba District and remained engaged from 1994 to September, 2004. He has also stated on oath that no notice under Section 25-F of the Act was given by the respondent before terminating his service and at the same time no compensation in lieu thereof notice period was paid to him and thus his termination was illegal and void entitling petitioner benefit of reinstatement of service with full back wages and all the other consequential service benefits. The petitioner has further alleged on oath that respondent/department after terminating his services in September, 2004 by oral order had engaged several co-workers who were junior to petitioner were retained in service. Not only this, the persons who were junior to petitioner are stated to have been regularized in service and thus respondent had not followed the mandate of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act which was obligatory on its part. The case of petitioner also remains that he had served respondent with due diligence and had spotless service record as respondent/department had never called any explanation or raised charge-sheet against him but even while retrenching petitioner from service, no notice was given. The petitioner has also explained reason for not approaching the authorities under Labour Act and thereafter before this Tribunal and petitioner had moved before the Labour Officer raising demand notice consequent upon which a failure

report was submitted and as the Labour Commissioner did not make reference for industrial dispute raised by petitioner, the petitioner had moved before the Hon'ble High Court by filing CWP where direction was passed for making reference to the Labour Court due to which delay had occurred and same was satisfactorily explained.

14. In so far as plea of abandonment raised by respondent is concerned, the same merits rejection in view of the fact that respondent had failed to produce any record by which it could be established that whenever petitioner absented from his duty as also reflected in mandays chart Ex. RW1/B any notice or letter was ever issued. On this point respondent as RW1 has specifically admitted that whenever petitioner abandoned the job, no notice had been issued. RW1 specifically admitted that no departmental inquiry was initiated against petitioner even after September, 2004. No reason whatsoever has been assigned for such any action or omission on the part of respondent in not initiating any departmental proceedings or making correspondence calling upon the petitioner to join service. This *prima facie* belies the stand taken by the respondent as abandonment has to be proved like any other fact in issue. The petitioner, on the other hand, as PW1 in cross-examination has specifically denied that he used to leave the job in between and attended the work intermittently rather he has claimed that intermittent breaks had been deliberately given to him by the respondent in the service record of petitioner so that petitioner did not complete 160 days of work as required for Pangi Tehsil area and also for applicability of Section 25-B of the Act. As such, in absence of any specific and reliable evidence led by respondent, it would be unsafe to hold that respondent had established plea of abandonment.

15. A bare glance on the mandays chart Ex. RW1/B would reveal that petitioner had worked for 163 days in the year 1994, 111 days in 1995, 180 days in 1996, 96 days in 1997, 109 days in 1998, 140 days in 1999, 137 days in 2000, 73.5 days in 2001, 62 days in 2002, 84 days in 2003 and 78 days in 2004 and thus a total of his service in 1994 to 2004 in 11 years he had worked for 1233.5 days in his entire service period. Be it noticed that except the years 1995 and 1997 to 2004 petitioner had worked for more than 160 days and as there is no reference from the Labour Commissioner, Shimla on the point of artificial breaks, this court is to confine its findings only with regard to alleged illegal termination. It is evident from mandays chart Ex. RW1/B that in the year 2005 the petitioner had merely worked for 56 days and thus immediately in preceding 12 calendar months from the month of termination of petitioner had not rendered service of 160 days so as to meet requirement of law of having continuous service of one year and thus it was not at all required from respondent to have issued a notice envisaged under Section 25-F of the Act. As such, the respondent is held to have not violated the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

16. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended with vehemence that large number of workers who were junior to petitioner had been appointed from 01.8.1997 to 07.9.1999 and these workers have been retained in service and regularized. The grievance of petitioner remains that principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed as the juniors were retained and services of petitioner despite being senior was terminated without any valid reason. Ex. PW1/B, Ex. PW1/C, Ex. PW1/D are the year-wise mandays of daily waged workers who were junior to the petitioner and had joined in the year 1996 or thereafter whereas Ex. PW1/E to Ex. PW1/L are the mandays chart of other co-workers. All of these co-workers shown in Ex. PW1/E the year-wise mandays details of workers of Division HPPWD Killar were certainly junior to petitioner who were given sufficient work existing in those years more than 200 days in a year whereas the petitioner had been not given muster roll for the whole month. Ex. PW1/E also established that all the co-workers shown in this document have worked for more than 160 days in most of the years although they were junior to petitioner. Evidently, there is no *iota* of evidence of respondent establishing that petitioner was called upon to join

for service at any time after September, 2004 even at the time when junior persons were reengaged. That being so the respondent had certainly violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act as the juniors workers mentioned in para No.3 of the affidavit were retained whereas petitioner was senior from these co-workers having joined service in 1994 was terminated and even thereafter respondent omitted to afford opportunity to petitioner for reemployment for work which also violates the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment of **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** in which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that for the applicability of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act, **there was no necessity of claimant/petitioner to have worked for 240 days as in case of provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.**

17. Repudiating claim of petitioner, the respondent, on the other hand, has made futile attempt to justify engagement of junior workers and their retention in service on the basis of orders of Labour Court-*cum*-Industrial Tribunal as well as Hon'ble High Court of H.P. as reflected in Ex. RW1/D1 to Ex RW1/D22. These judgments/orders have been gone through which revealed that respondent had wrongly terminated the services of those claimant/ petitioner and for said reasons they were directed to be reinstated. Thus, plea that persons were directed to be appointed in pursuance to awards/orders Ext. RW1/D1 to Ex. RW1/D22 were primarily on the basis of court orders would not defeat the claim of the petitioner as status of these person being junior to petitioner does not get negatived. As such, even when petitioner is proved to have not worked for more than 160 days in preceding 8 years which entitled him for regularization of his service per government policy, yet respondent is not absolved from its accountability of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act and as such it is held that respondent had violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act.

18. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in September, 2004, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Authorized Representative of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivatable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

19. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Authorized Representative for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*
>
> **14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors.** vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
>
> "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in

raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

20. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent/department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2004 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Dy. D.A., ld.

AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-**cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

21. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub- Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and his termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. His services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

I have gone through the rival contention of the ld. Authorized Representative as well as ld. Dy. D.A. for State. Keeping in view the mandate of Hon'ble Apex Court in various judgments referred to above it is held that delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance and court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of judgment 2013 supra has referred to **Gitam Singh's** case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** observing that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas his services have been terminated in 1986 and he raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh alongwith interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of

compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 11 years and actually worked for 1233.5 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in September, 2004 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **six years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 18.8.2010. It is also pertinent to mention here that petitioner on the date of filing claim petition was ageing 39 years who has sufficient spell of life to work and earn his livelihood. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but compensation a lump-sum would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. Similar view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled as **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473.** Ld. Dy. D.A. representing State/respondents has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in **AIR 2016 SC 2984** titled as **Prabhakar** v. **Joint Director Sericulture Department and another.** I have gone through the judgment which deals reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act in which it has been held that Hon'ble High Court can intervene in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 when reference has been challenged on the ground of inordinate unexplained delay. Since the reference made by the Government in this case is not in challenge before this Court, the above said judgment would not be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreso in view of observation qua facts made in judgment **(2016)** *supra,* claimant/petitioner was found to be an educated person who was working as Clerk whereas in case before this Court, the petitioner is an illiterate unskilled worker. For the abovesaid reasons, plea of delay and laches would not eclipse claim of petitioner.

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award and its realization. Issues no. 1, 2 and 4 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.3 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu

of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 4th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-**INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.**

Ref. No.	: 377/2015
Date of Institution	: 18-8-2015
Date of decision	: 20-9-2017

Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR

For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.

AWARD

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

"Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. before the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, *vide* demand notice dated 12.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers

from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the services of Shri Abdul Sitar s/o Shri Ramjan, r/o Village and Post Office Rajpura, Tehsil Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. by the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.

3. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura *w.e.f.* 03.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. In the year 2003, the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized however service of petitioner was terminated in the year 2003. It is further alleged that when the services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 2003 it was assured that petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the officers/officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to contract but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15 days on contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which is unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent had retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized. It is further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior approval from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As respondent in gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of petitioner due to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by which petitioner was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the respondent had appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar Nath, Khairati Ram, Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar, Ghinder Dutt, Hans Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram, Man Singh, Mukesh Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder, Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also averred that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while engaging the services of abovestated juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of petitioner. It is further alleged that respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/ department who had never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or misconduct however petitioner had worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had committed gross violation of statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act in malafide, arbitrary, unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating principle of natural justice which was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner thus prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from daily waged services during year 2003 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified and petitioner be engaged on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had been working continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the petitioner be reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the petitioner remained unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is prayed that the period of intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner during period from 3.1.1992 onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each year under Section 25-B of the Act and regularize the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 1.1.2002 as per

Govt. regularization policy framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in **Mool Raj Upadhayay** vs. **State of H.P. and others** and from the date of regularization of juniors of petitioner along-with all consequential service benefits.

4. The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections *qua* maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as per his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the respondent/department upto the year 2003 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will and convenience and never reported for work after 2003. It is alleged that petitioner had never worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. It is, however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent and that junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not violated provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally provided work to petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given to petitioner to engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the service condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each calendar year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2003. It is averred that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the respondent had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of petitioner were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already known to petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is contended that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such there was no violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus alleges claim petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.

5. The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

6. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and closed evidence.

7. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 17.12.2015 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 12.12.2011 *qua* his termination of service during year, 2003 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during year 2003 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief :

8. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present reference.

9. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.75,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 to 3:

10. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

11. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by respondent on 3.1.1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 2003. Be it noticed that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the services of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15 days to knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar by the respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 2003 on which date his services were illegally terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from date of termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner was engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his own sweet will and convenience during year 2003. However, there is nothing on record to establish that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of the petitioner which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish that the petitioner has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination. The perusal of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had worked only for 45 days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1995, 21 days in 2000, 222 days in 2001, 177 days in 2002 and 83 days in 2003. In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus retrenchment of petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

12. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240 days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.

13. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally terminated by the respondent by verbal order in the year 2003 which had been denied by respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had examined Shri K.L.Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has deposed that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2003. It is admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact' which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled **State of H.P.** vs. **Bhatag Ram and Anr. (2007 Latest HLJ 903).** Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be relied upon *qua* allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no *iota* of evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held that petitioner had not abandoned the job.

14. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex. PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2003 and that some of the workers had been re-engaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.

15. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25-G of the Act, the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** and **Harjinder Singh** vs. **Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116**. **In HP State Electricity Board** vs. **Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320**. It has come in the evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court, were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of law laid down in judgments (*supra*). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus, the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.

16. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 42 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in the year 2003, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was

illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

17. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> "12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.
>
> **13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist.** The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to *supra.* Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to *supra.*
>
> **14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—
>
> "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *vs.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the

industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to *supra.* The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

18. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2003 and the industrial dispute was raised after eight years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon'ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute. Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

19. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10-Limitation Act, 1963-Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D.Act-Workman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs.one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

20. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/ petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may

be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No. 5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and Ors.** reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.

21. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para Nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 06 years and actually worked

for 556 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in 2003 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **eight years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 12.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.* **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.**

22. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No.4 :

23. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

24. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees seventy five thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

25. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

26. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

27. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 20th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA)
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

IN THE COURT OF SHRI K. K. SHARMA PRESIDING JUDGE, LABOUR COURT-CUM-INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, KANGRA AT DHARAMSHALA, H.P.

Ref. No. : 378/2015
Date of Institution : 18-8-2015
Date of decision : 20-9-2017

Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. . .*Petitioner.*

Versus

The Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. . .*Respondent.*

Reference under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

For the Petitioner : Sh. I.S. Jaryal, AR
For the Respondent : Sh. Sanjeev Singh Rana, Ld. Dy.D.A.

AWARD

The following reference has been received from the appropriate Government for adjudication:

> "Whether the industrial dispute raised by the worker Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. before the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. *vide* demand notice dated 12.12.2011 regarding his alleged illegal termination of service during year, 2003 suffers from delay and laches? If not, Whether termination of the service of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu Ram, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. by the Deputy Director of Horticulture, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 2003 without complying the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above aggrieved workman is entitled to from the above employer?"

2. After the receipt of the abovestated reference, a corrigendum dated 20th February, 2016 was received from the appropriate government which reads as under:

> "In partial modification of this Department's Notification of even number dated 05-08-2015, the date of termination of services of Shri Kirpa Ram s/o Shri Rasalu, r/o Village Salla, P.O. Mani, Tehsil and District Chamba, H.P. may be read as "21-06-2005" instead of "year, 2003", which was inadvertently recorded in the said notification".

3. On receipt of reference from appropriate government, notices were issued to the parties in pursuance to which claimant/petitioner has filed statement of claim before this court.

4. Brief facts as set up in the claim petition reveal that petitioner was engaged as daily waged labourer on muster roll basis with the respondent department in PCDO Rajpura *w.e.f.* 01.01.1992 who worked continuously with intermittent/artificial breaks. On 21.6.2005, the respondent had orally terminated services of petitioner without any reason whereas the workers junior to petitioner had been retained and their services have been regularized

however service of petitioner was terminated on 21.6.2005. It is further alleged that when the services of petitioner were illegally terminated orally on 21.5.2006 it was assured that petitioner would be engaged on contract basis but when petitioner requested with the officers/ officials of respondent/department not to change his service condition from daily wage to contract but it was of no avail. It is alleged that petitioner had given short term/spell of 10-15 days on contract basis in a year just to deprive the petitioner from continuity and seniority which is unfair labour practice within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act whereas the respondent had retained junior workers continuously on muster roll basis who were consequently regularized. It is further alleged that respondent had not followed the relevant provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' for brevity) and had also not taken any prior approval from the appropriate government as well as written consent from petitioner. As respondent in gross violation of statutory provisions of law had changed service conditions of petitioner due to which he could not complete criteria of 240 days in each calendar year by which petitioner was deprived from benefit of regularization. It is further averred that the respondent had appointed/engaged many daily waged junior to the petitioner namely Amar Nath, Khairati Ram, Om Prakash, Roshan Lal, Dharam Chand, Narain Singh, Suresh Kumar, Ghinder Dutt, Hans Raj, Joginder Singh, Dharam Chand, Jodh Singh, Devi Parshad, Jagat Ram, Man Singh, Mukesh Kumari, Punam, Shakuntla, Sushil Kumar, Kartar Chand, Devinder, Kaushalya, Sudarshna Devi and Bachan Singh who were appointed in the years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 respectively and their service have been regularized. It is also averred that respondent had not followed the provisions of Section 25-G of 'the Act' while engaging the services of abovestated juniors on muster roll but changed the service condition of petitioner. It is further alleged that respondent had given spotless services to the respondent/department who had never been charge-sheeted for any act of indiscipline, negligence of work or misconduct however petitioner had worked with full devotion. It is alleged that respondent had committed gross violation of statutory provision of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act in malafide, arbitrary, unconstitutional, illegal and unjustified manner besides violating principle of natural justice which was to 'unfair labour practice' within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner thus prayed that oral orders of illegal termination/retrenchment from daily waged services from 21.6.2005 be set aside being illegal, malafide, arbitrary and unjustified and petitioner be engaged on daily waged basis because juniors workmen engaged after him had been working continuously on daily waged basis with the respondent. It is further prayed that the petitioner be reinstated along with full back wages, seniority, continuity in service as the petitioner remained unemployed from the date of his illegal retrenchment/termination. It is prayed that the period of intermittent/fictional breaks which has been given to the petitioner during period from 1.1.1992 onward for calculation of continuous service of 240 days in each year under Section 25-B of the Act and regularize the service of petitioner *w.e.f.* 1.1.2002 as per Govt. regularization policy framed in view of Hon'ble Apex Court decision in **Mool Raj Upadhayay** vs. **State of H.P. and others** and from the date of regularization of juniors of petitioner alongwith all consequential service benefits.

5. The respondent contested the claim petition filed reply *inter-alia* taken preliminary objections *qua* maintainability, claim of the petitioner being bad on account of delay and laches. On merits, admitted that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily waged labourer to carryout seasonal and occasional work in the year 1992 subject to work and funds besides stated that he had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement was as intermittent worker for seasonal work and the petitioner had worked with the respondent as per his own convenience and sweet will. It is further stated that petitioner had worked with the respondent/department upto the year 2005 and thereafter 'abandoned' the job at his own sweet will and convenience and never reported for work after 2005. It is alleged that petitioner had never worked with the respondent/department during the years 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. It is, however, denied that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the respondent and that

junior workmen had been retained by respondent continuously and not violated provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is denied that respondent had intentionally provided work to petitioner for short term/spell of 10-15 days however no assurance was given to petitioner to engage him on contract basis. It is also denied that respondent had changed the service condition of petitioner who is opted to have never completed 240 days of work in each calendar year since petitioner did not come for work with the respondent after the year 2005. It is averred that only those workers had been regularized by the respondent/department who had completed the requisite criteria for regularization as per the government policy and as such the respondent had not violated any principle of 'Last come First go'. It is stated that the services of petitioner were engaged by the respondent intermittently for seasonal work which was already known to petitioner and no fictional breaks were ever given to petitioner by the respondent. It is contended that no new/fresh workmen/labourers had been engaged by respondent and as such there was no violation of provisions of Section 25-G and 25-H of the Act. The respondent thus alleges claim petition to be devoid of merit which was accordingly sought to be dismissed.

6. The petitioner filed rejoinder to reply filed by respondent, reiterated his stand as maintained in the claim petition.

7. To prove his case, petitioner had examined himself as PW1 tendered/proved his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. PW1/A, seniority list Ex. PW1/B to Ex. PW1/D, copy of order dated 19.5.2011 Ex. PW1/E, copy of order dated 11.8.2015 Ex. PW1/F and closed evidence. On the other hand, repudiating the evidence led by petitioner, respondent had examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who tendered/proved his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 CPC, Ex. RW1/B copy of mandays chart of petitioner, Ex. RW1/C letter No.15-80/79-Horticulture, copy of certificate dated 3.9.2011 Ex. RW1/D and closed evidence.

8. From the contentions raised, following issues were framed on 24.10.2016 for determination:

1. Whether the industrial dispute raised by petitioner *vide* demand notice dated 12.12.2011 *qua* his termination of service *w.e.f.* 21.6.2005 by respondent suffers from the vice of delay and laches as alleged? If so, its effect? . .*OPP.*

2. Whether termination of the services of petitioner by the respondent during 21.6.2005 is/was illegal and unjustified as alleged? . .*OPP.*

3. If issue No. 2 is proved in affirmative, to what service benefits the petitioner is entitled to? . .*OPP.*

4. Whether the claim petition is not maintainable in the present form as alleged? . .*OPR.*

Relief:

9. I have heard the Authorized Representative/counsel as well as Ld. Dy. D.A. for respondent gone through evidence on record carefully relevant for disposal of the present reference.

10. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter while discussing the aforesaid issues, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as follows:

Issue No.1 : Discussed

Issue No.2 : Yes

Issue No.3 : Discussed

Issue No.4 : No

Relief : Petition is partly allowed awarding compensation of Rs.1,60,000/- per operative part of award.

REASONS FOR FINDINGS

Issues No. 1 to 3 :

11. All these issues have been taken up together for discussion being interconnected which can be disposed of simultaneously without repetition of evidence.

12. It is admitted case of the parties that the services of the petitioner were engaged by respondent on 1992 who worked as daily wage labourer intermittently till 21.6.2005. Be it noticed that the respondent had not placed/exhibited on record any document evidencing that the services of the petitioner used to be engaged for specific period or for short spell of 10-15 days to knowledge of peittioner. The case of the petitioner remains that he was engaged as beldar by the respondent in the year 1992 and worked till 21.6.2005 on which date his services were illegally terminated and that he had completed 240 days continuously preceding 12 months from date of termination On the other hand, it remains the plea of the respondent that the petitioner was engaged as casual labourer in the year 1992 who had not completed 240 days in any calendar year since his initial engagement as petitioner is alleged to have abandoned the job of his own sweet will and convenience in the month of June, 2005. However, there is nothing on record to establish that that the petitioner had completed 240 days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination except bald statement of the petitioner. On the other hand, the mandays chart of the petitioner which has been placed on record as Ex. RW1/B by the respondent establish that the petitioner has factually not completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination. The perusal of mandays chart of the petitioner Ex. RW1/B shows that petitioner had worked only for 29 days during the year 1992, 08 days in 1994, 194 days in 1999, 229 days in 2000, 230 days in 2001, 158 days in 2002, 216 days in 2003, 211 days in 2004 and 81 days in 2005. In view of mandays chart referred to above plea of petitioner having completed 240 days in 12 calendar months preceding his termination cannot be accepted and thus retrenchment of petitioner cannot be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act.

13. It is also remains the plea of the petitioner that the services of Shakuntla Devi and Kaushalya Devi and others as mentioned in his affidavit have been regularized despite the fact that they were appointed much after petitioner however such plea of the petitioner has been denied by the respondent. On the other hand, plea of the respondent remains that persons figuring at serial Nos. 17 to 24 in the seniority list Ex. PW1/D were re-engaged as per orders of the Hon'ble High Court and they were not junior to the petitioner. It further the plea of respondent that services of workmen at serial No. 17 to 24 have been regularized as they had completed 240 days in each calendar year which was only the criteria for regularization of daily wagers.

14. The plea of the petitioner remains that service of petitioner was illegally terminated by the respondent by verbal order in June, 2005 which had been denied by respondent. On the contrary, it is the plea of the respondent that the petitioner had left the job of his own accord and free volition. To support the plea of the abandonment, the respondent had examined Shri K. L. Sharma, Deputy Director, Horticulture, Chamba as RW1 who has

deposed that the services of petitioner were engaged in the year 1992 who worked upto 2005. It is admitted case of respondent/department to have engaged petitioner on muster roll basis however denied services of petitioner were retrenched. It is admitted case of respondent that neither notice nor compensation in lieu of notice was ever given to petitioner. It is admitted that no approval was taken from the government at the time of retrenchment of the service of petitioner. It is denied that department had not followed principle of 'Last come First go'. It is admitted that when respondent/department had given work to petitioner he always remained present for the work. It was denied that petitioner was not kept on seasonal work. There is nothing on record to remotely suggest that any notice was served upon the petitioner for his willful and unauthorized absence from the duty. There is also no documentary evidence on record to show that some correspondence worth the name in this behalf had been addressed to the petitioner. Nothing except the bald statement of RW-1, the respondent in this case there is nothing to show that the petitioner had in fact abandoned the job. It is well settled preposition of law that the 'abandonment' has to be established by leading evidence and it is a 'question of fact' which has to be determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of each case, as has been held by our own Hon'ble High Court in a case titled **State of H.P.** vs. **Bhatag Ram and Anr. (2007 Latest HLJ 903).** Absence from duty is a serious misconduct and admittedly no disciplinary proceedings was ever initiated against the petitioner by the respondent for his alleged willful absence from duty. In view of same, bald and uncorroborated statement of RW-1 cannot be relied upon qua allegation of abandonment of job by petitioner moreso when there is no *iota* of evidence on record of respondent establishing that any notice was issued which was served upon petitioner and there being no record of initiation of disciplinary proceedings and thus for want of such specific evidence inference of abandonment could not be drawn and thus it is held that petitioner had not abandoned the job.

15. It also remains plea of the petitioner that the persons junior to him namely Devi Parkash, Jagat Ram, Man Singh and others have been retained in service which was in violation of the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act. It is not disputed by the respondent that the abovestated workmen were engaged as daily waged labourers who were still continuously working with the respondent/department. This fact also finds support from seniority list Ex. PW1/D, which establishes that workmen mentioned in serial Nos. 17 to 24 were initially engaged during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 & 2001 respectively who were junior to the petitioner and admittedly engaged during January, 1992 and have still been retained in service by the respondent/department. In his cross-examination, RW1 has specifically admitted when petitioner and other workers were retrenched in the year 2005 and that some of the workers had been reengaged by the respondent/department except the petitioner and their services had been regularized. In view of foregoing, the respondent can be safely held to have violated the provisions of Section 25-G of the Act which is mandatory in nature and non-compliance of the said provision vitiates retrenchment entitling petitioner for relief claimed.

16. It is by now well settled that for seeking the protection of Sections 25- G of the Act, the requirement of having completed 240 days is not a condition precedent as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Central Bank of India** vs. **S. Satyam, 1996 (5) SCC 419** and **Harjinder Singh** vs. **Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, AIR 2010 SC 1116**. **In HP State Electricity Board** vs. **Shri Charan Dass 2012(1) Him. L.R. (DB) 320**. It has come in the evidence that respondent failed to establish that the petitioner has abandoned the job of his own free will as discussed in foregoing paras and the respondent retained the daily waged labourer who were junior to the petitioner in service whereas case of the respondent remains that no person junior to the petitioner save and except those who were ordered to be reinstated by the Court, were retained in service. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of H.P. that the plea of the respondent itself reveals that the persons junior to the petitioner have been retained in service and as such the respondent is held to have violated the provisions of

Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act and that completion of 240 days by the workman in a calendar year is not required for seeking the protection under Sections 25-G and 25-H of the Act in view of law laid down in judgments (*supra*). Thus, in view of such settled preposition of law even if the petitioner has not completed the requisite number of days in the 12 calendar months preceding his termination, the respondent was still bound to follow the principle of 'last come first go', which has not been done in the present case while engaging junior persons. Thus, the termination of the services of the petitioner is illegal being against the mandatory provisions of Sections 25-G of the Act.

17. On perusal of the statement of claim as filed by the petitioner and his statement on oath while appearing as PW1, it is clear that the petitioner has not uttered a single word that he was not gainfully employed during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim rather admitted that petitioner had cultivable land from which he could have his livelihood. In view of this, the petitioner has failed to discharge the initial onus that during the period of his retrenchment till filing of the claim, he was not gainfully employed. The petitioner while appearing as PW1 has stated his age as 36 years and it can be safely assumed that a young man like the petitioner would not have sat ideally at home during the period despite the fact that he was out of the job. Ld. Authorized Representative for petitioner has contended that after petitioner's termination in June, 2005, he had remained unemployed and was not earning anything thereafter as such was entitled for full back wages. Repudiating the arguments of ld. Counsel of petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. for the State has taken this court through cross-examination of the petitioner who has admitted that he had cultivable land with him and also worked a private labourer. Thus, plea of having remained not gainfully employed gets belied from admission of petitioner in cross-examination in which he had maintained that he had been earning from agricultural land as well as he has been working as daily wager privately. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court **North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation** vs. **M. Nagangouda (2007) 10 SCC 765** in which Division Bench comprising of Justice A.R. Lakshmanan and Justice Altamas Kabir had held that '**term gainfully employment would also include self employment wherefrom income is generated. It was income either from employment in an establishment or from self employment merely differentiates the sources from which income is generated, the end use being the same'**. Applying the ratio of judgment of 2007 (*supra*) to this case since the petitioner was earning from his agricultural and manual pursuits, the same were sufficient to maintain him and his family. It is thus held that petitioner was gainfully employed. Be it stated here that Hon'ble Apex Court in **Deepali Gundu Surwase's** case has held that the Labour Court was not justified in holding that merely because the respondent was receiving agriculture income, he cannot be treated to be engaged in gainful employment. Since the petitioner had income from agriculture pursuits for his livelihood it cannot be stated that petitioner was not gainfully employed and thus would not be entitled full back wages. In view of the forgoing discussion, it is held that the relationship of workman and employer existed between petitioner and respondent and that petitioner was illegally retrenched without compliance of Section 25-G and Section 25-H of the Act although remained gainfully employed after his retrenchment. Thus, applying the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (2007 *supra*), it may not be erroneous to hold that petitioner was gainfully employed and thus would be not entitled for back wages for the period he was out of job on being terminated by the respondent.

18. Lastly, Ld. Dy. D.A. for State has contended with vehemence that there is inordinate and explained delay which disentitles petitioner relief claimed for by him. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014 Lab IC 4266 (SC)** and the relevant paras of the judgment are produced below for reference:

"12. Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in the Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board case (*supra*) upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the 2nd issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to *supra,* wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer.

13. In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in the Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services & Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra.

14. Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in the case of S.M. Nilajkar & Ors. vs. **Telecom District Manager, Karnataka**[4] it was held by this Court as follows—

"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree..... In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. *v.* Union of India and Ors. (*supra*)1993 AIR SCW 2214, it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants for any relief....." (Emphasis laid by the Court) In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in the above judgment, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against his and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer.

15. In the case of Ajaib Singh *vs.* The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing-*cum*-Processing Service Society Limited & Anr.[5] this Court has opined that relief cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay, stating that:—

"10. It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages....." (Emphasis laid by the Court)

16. Hence, we are of the opinion, having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case that there is no delay or laches on the part of the workman from the date of his acquittal in the criminal case. Thereafter, upon failure of the respondent in adhering to the assurance given to the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case, the workman approached the conciliation officer and the State Government to make a reference to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute with regard to the order of dismissal passed by the respondent. Keeping in mind the date of acquittal of the appellant and the date on which he approached the conciliation officer by raising the dispute, since the respondent had not adhered to its assurance, the State Government had rightly referred the dispute for its adjudication. Therefore it cannot be said that there was a delay on the part of the appellant in raising the dispute and getting it referred to the Labour Court by the State Government.

17. Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the Civil Writ Petition & the Letters Patent Appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in Industrial Jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large.

19. Ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has also contended with vehemence that claim petition is barred by limitation on account of delay and laches. It has been pointed that termination of petitioner in this case took place on 2005 and the industrial dispute was raised after several years of retrenchment. Repudiating the argument by ld. Counsel, ld. AR for the petitioner has placed reliance upon judgment reported in **2007 LHLJ 903 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. (Bhatag Ram's case)** in which it has been held that delay in raising dispute may be considered by court at the time of granting final relief however in various other judgments even longer delay has been condoned. **In Divisional Manager, HPFC & another** vs. **Garibu Ram, Latest HLJ 2007 (HP) 1160**, delay of more than 10 years was condoned besides Hon"ble High Court has held that principle of Limitation Act is not applicable to the industrial dispute.

Similar view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in **Ajayab Singh** vs. **Sirhind Co-operative Marketing**-cum-**Processing Society Limited and Another, (1999) 6 SCC 82** in which it has been held that the principle of Limitation Act, 1963 did not apply to the proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act.

20. Relying upon the aforestated judgment, it has been contended that claim of petitioner cannot be defeated on the point of delay and laches. Repudiating arguments advanced by ld. Counsel for petitioner, ld. Dy. D.A. has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court titled as **Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal [2013 (139) FLR 125],** the relevant para of the judgment are produced below for reference:

> Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Sections 25-F and 10- Limitation Act, 1963- Section 5-Industrial dispute-Termination of service-Finding of Labour Court that workman had completed 240 days in calendar year and her termination was in violation of section 25-F of the I.D. Act-Wokrman worked from 1.11.1984 to 17.2.1986 in all 286 days during employment. Her services terminated on 18.2.1986. Industrial dispute raised after 6 years of termination. Admitted delay of 6 years not kept in view by the Labour Court-Judicial discretion exercised by the Labour Court flawed and unsustainable. Reinstatement of the workman not the appropriate relief. In lieu of reinstatement compensation of Rs. one lac directed to be paid to the workman by the appellant-employer within six weeks failing which interest @ 9% P.A. will be payable. [Paras 21 and 22]
>
> Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Section 25-F-Termination of service-**Industrial dispute raised after six years-Limitation Act not applicable to reference made under the I.D. Act-Delay in raising industrial disputes definitely an important circumstances which the Labour Court must keep in view before granting relief".**

21. Repudiating the arguments by ld. Dy. D.A. for the State, ld. Counsel for claimant/petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as **Tapash Kumar Paul** vs. **BSNL & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 357** wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a Court may pass an order of reinstatement by awarding compensation but the same has to be based on justifiable grounds. In this judgment, it was held that compensation can be granted in a situation where the industry is closed **or** that employees has superannuated or going to retire shortly and no period is left to his credit **or** where workman has been rendered in capacitated to discharge duties cannot be reinstated and/or fourthly when he has lost confidence of the management to discharge duties. It was observed that there may be appropriate cases on facts which may justify substituting an order of reinstatement by award of compensation but that **has to be supported by some legal and justifiable reasons indicating why the reinstatement should be followed to be substituted by award of compensation.** Ld. Counsel for the petitioner with the aid of above-said judgment had argued that there are only **four situations** when a worker may be awarded compensation instead of reinstatement but the judgment certainly not correctly appreciated by ld. Counsel as this judgment postulates probable four situations which are illustrative in nature where compensation may be awarded instead of reinstatement but that does not mean that except the four grounds, no other ground would be appropriate for awarding compensation. In the case in hand before this court, it has come that petitioner had abandoned the job who did not report for duty for several years and later gave notice requesting for joining of duties but the conditions in para No.5 of judgment (2015 *supra*) even if not met requirement, cannot be a ground to reinstate the petitioner and it is only compensation which would be appropriate relief. Ld. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Hon'be Apex Court titled as **Deepali Gundu Surwase** vs. **Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)**

and Ors. reported in **AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 121**, **Raghubir Singh** vs. **General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar** reported in **2014(3) Apex Court Judgments 652.** I have gone through these judgments and of view that they don't come to rescue the petitioner on point of reinstatement instead of compensation. Ld. Dy. D.A. for State on the other hand has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **Vice Chancellor, Lucknow University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** v. **Akhilesh Kumar Khare & another** reported in **AIR 2015 SC 3473**. It has been contended that engagement of claimant/petitioner in this case was not through regular mode of recruitment and applying the ratio of this judgment **AIR 2015 SC supra**, claim of petitioner for reinstatement can be negated and thus compensation would be sufficient for redressal of grievance of the claimant/petitioner. Similarly, in **2016 (1) Him. L.R. 502** titled as **State of Himachal Pradesh and another** vs. **Chaman Singh** relied by ld. AR for petitioner interpretation of Section 137 of Limitation Act was involved which provides that Article 137 of Limitation Act did not apply to industrial disputes. **In 2014 (3) Apex Court Judgment 652 (SC)** similar view was reiterated which clearly mandates that claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief sought for merely on the ground of delay and laches. That being so, the law remains as it was that ground of delay and laches, claimant/petitioner cannot be denied relief rather the court has to consider various aspects before moulding relief and the case in hand it would not be erroneous to mention here that the claimant/petitioner can be reasonably indemnified by ordering compensation and not by reinstatement. In so far as judgment of **AIR 2015 SC 1373** titled as **Mackinon Machenize & Company Ltd.** vs. **Mackinon Employees Union** is concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held on closure of unit of company principle of 'Last come First go' was not followed which violated Section 25-G of Industrial Disputes Act and retrenchment was held illegal entitling petitioner for retrenchment compensation.

22. After hearing the rival contentions of the parties and case law relied by them, it can be safely concluded that delay in raising industrial dispute is certainly important aspect/ circumstance which court has to keep in mind while exercising discretion. In para nos. 20 and 21 of the judgment as referred to in this case reported in **2013 (136) FLR 893 (SC)** titled as **Assistant Engineer Rajasthan Development Corporation and another** vs. **Geetam Singh** provides that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to keep in mind all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment (2013 *supra*) before that workman had worked for 286 days and had raised industrial dispute in 1992 whereas her services have been terminated in 1986 and she raised industrial dispute after **six years**. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that though compensation awarded by Single Judge of the Hon'ble High Court was too low and liable to be enhanced by the Division Bench **but surely reinstatement of the workman in the facts and circumstances is not the appropriate relief** and thus Hon'ble Apex Court awarded a lump-sum of Rs.1 lakh along-with interest @ 9% per annum if the respondent failed to make payment of compensation within six weeks from the date of judgment. In the case in hand before this court factors which have weighed are that the petitioner in all remained engaged for about 09 years and actually worked for 1356 days as per mandays chart on record and that the services of petitioner were disengaged in June, 2005 who worked as non skilled worker and had raised industrial dispute by issuance of demand notice after about **six years** *i.e.* demand notice was given on 12.12.2011. Taking into consideration factors mentioned above in pursuance to judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, petitioner would not be entitled either for reinstatement or for back wages but a lump-sum compensation would be appropriate relief in view of judgment **2013 (139) FLR 25** (SC). The judgments relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioner on the matter of delay and laches is more or less settled law that claim of the petitioner could not be solely declined on the ground of delay and laches. Similarly, judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in **2014** titled as **Raghubir Singh's** case also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner as in this judgment also

the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the mandate as given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in previous judgment in the year **2013** *i.e.***Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division Kota and Mohan Lal's** case. I have gone through these judgments which are not attracted in this present case as this court not declining relief to the petitioner on the ground of limitation rather on the basis of guidelines of Hon'ble Apex Court laid down in judgment of **2013.**

23. In view of foregoing discussion, a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) would be an appropriate relief to which the petitioner is entitled in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above. It is further made clear that amount of compensation shall be paid within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the petitioner would be entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from date of Award till its realization. Issues No. 1 to 3 are answered accordingly.

Issue No. 4 :

24. On the plea of non-maintainability of the claim petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, ld. Dy. D.A. representing respondent department has failed to allege in reply in what manner petition is not maintainable. Thus, vague plea merits rejection outright. Otherwise also, from pleadings and evidence on record, no inference of claim petition being not maintainable could be raised against claimant/petitioner. This issue is decided in favour of petitioner and against the respondent.

Relief :

25. As sequel to my findings on foregoing issues, the respondent is hereby directed to pay the compensation of Rs.1,60,000/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand only) to the petitioner in lieu of the reinstatement, back wages, seniority and past service benefits. Amount of compensation so awarded will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within four months from the date of receipt of Award failing which the respondent shall be liable to pay the interest @ 9% per annum on the said amount from the date of award till the date of its realization. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

26. The reference is answered in the aforesaid terms.

27. A copy of this Award be sent to the appropriate Government for publication in the official gazette.

28. File, after due completion be consigned to the Record Room.

Announced in the open Court today this 29th day of September, 2017.

Sd/-
(K. K. SHARMA),
Presiding Judge,
Labour Court-cum-*Industrial Tribunal,*
Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.

INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT
A-Section

NOTIFICATION

Shimla-2,the 12th July, 2018

No. Ind-A(B)8-4/2017.—On the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to order the promotion of Shri Pranav Kumar, Industrial Promotion Officer to the post of Manager, DIC (Class-II, Gazetted) in the pay scale of ₹10300-34800+₹4400 Grade pay in the Department of Industries, H.P. with immediate effect.

The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is further pleased to order the posting of Shri Pranav Kumar, Manager at DIC Kangra against vacant post, with immediate effect, in public interest.

The officer shall remain on probation for a period of two years. He will also exercise option for fixation of pay under the provisions of FR-22, within a period of one month from the date of issue of this Notification.

The above Officer is directed to join his duties within 10 days and submit his joining report to this Department through the Director of Industries, H.P., failing which the promotion orders will automatically be treated as withdrawn.

By order,
R. D. DHIMAN, IAS,
Principal Secretary (Inds.).

In the Court of Shri Chander Mohan Thakur, Executive Magistrate (Naib-Tehsildar)
Solan, District Solan, H. P.

In the matter of :

Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan, Himachal Pradesh . . *Applicant.*

Versus

General Public . . *Respondent.*

Application under section 13(3) of Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969.

Ms. Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh, r/o Village & P.O. Basal, Tehsil & District Solan, Himachal Pradesh has moved an application before the undersigned under section 13(3) of Birth & Death Registration Act, 1969 alongwith affidavit and other documents for enter her birth in the record of Gram Panchayat Basal, she was born on 08-08-1981 at Village Basal, Tehsil & District Solan, but her birth could not be entered in the record of Gram Panchayat Basal, Tehsil & District Solan.

Therefore, by this proclamation, the general public is hereby informed that any person having any objection for the delayed registration of birth of Poonam Thapa d/o Sh. Sher Singh may submit their objection in writing or appear in person in this court on or before 18-07-2018 at 10.00 A.M. failing which no objection will be entertained after expiry of date.

Given under my hand and seal of the court on this 9th day of June, 2018.

Seal.

CHANDER MOHAN THAKUR,
Executive Magistrate (Tehsildar),
Solan, District Solan, H. P.

ब अदालत तहसीलदार एवं सहायक समाहर्ता, प्रथम वर्ग हरोली, जिला ऊना, हि0प्र0

इश्तहार मुश्त्री मुनादी जेर धारा–23 भू–राजस्व अधिनियम,1954

दरख्वास्त ब मुराद दरूस्ती राजस्व रिकार्ड महाल मानुवाल की जमाबन्दी साल 2012–2013 में वचित्र सिंह पुत्र सूकां की बजाये चतर सिंह पुत्र सूकां दर्ज करने बारे।

बनाम

आम जनता

बजरिया जमादार तहसील कार्यालय हरोली।

उपरोक्त मुकद्दमा उनवान वाला में प्रार्थी चतर सिंह पुत्र सूकां राम, वासी नंगल खुर्द, तहसील हरोली, जिला ऊना ने प्रार्थना–पत्र प्रस्तुत करके निवेदन किया है कि उसका नाम महाल मानुवाल की जमाबन्दी साल 2012–2013 में वचित्र सिंह पुत्र सूकां राम गलत चला आ रहा है जबकि उसका सही नाम चतर सिंह पुत्र सूकां राम है। इसलिये आप को निर्देश दिये जाते हैं कि हल्का हजा बजरिया मुश्त्री मुनादी उक्त प्रतिवादीगण को सूचित करे कि उक्त नाम की दरूस्ती बारे अगर किसी व्यक्ति को कोई उजर हो तो मुकद्दमा की पैरवी हेतु असालतन या वकालतन इस न्यायालय में दिनांक 17–07–2018 को प्रातः 10.00 बजे हाजिर आवे न आने की सूरत में उनके खिलाफ एकतरफा कार्यवाही अमल में लाई जाकर नियमानुसार मुकद्दमा का निपटारा कर दिया जायेगा ।

आज दिनांक 26–06–2018 को मेरे हस्ताक्षर व मोहर अदालत द्वारा जारी हुआ।

मोहर।

हस्ताक्षरित / –
तहसीलदार एवं सहायक समाहर्ता, प्रथम वर्ग,
हरोली, जिला ऊना, हि0प्र0।

In the Court of Marriage Officer-cum-**Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh**

In the matter of :

1. Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh, Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

2. Baby age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh .. *Applicants.*

Versus

General Public

Subject .—Application for registration of marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Whereas a application under section 15 of the Special Marriage Act has been received on 20-06-2018 by the undersigned from (1) Shri Dinesh Kumar age 27 years s/o Shri Chain Singh, Village Paproli, P.O. Nahri Devi Singh, Tehsil Bangana, District Una, Himachal Pradesh (2) Baby age 34 years d/o Sh. Rattan Chand, Village Salasi, Tehsil Sujanpur & District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh for the registration of their marriage. Hence, this proclamation is hereby issued for the information of general public that if any person has any objection for the registration of the above marriage, he/she can appear in this Court on or before 27-07-2018 to object registration of marriage either personally or through an authorized agent failing which marriage will be registered under this Act, accordingly.

Issued today on 29-06-2018 under my hand and seal of the court.

Seal. Sd/-

Marriage Officer-cum-*Sub Divisional Magistrate,*
Bangana,District Una (H.P.).

CHANGE OF NAME

I, Aruna Kumari (d/o Shri Jagir Singh) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur, Village Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara, Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P., employed in Govt. Primary School Badhal Noun, Elementary Education Block Dadasiba in H.P. Department of Elementary Education, has changed my name from Aruna Kumari to Aruna Thakur. All concerned to note please.

ARUNA THAKUR,
(d/o Jagir Singh) w/o Shri Kulbhushan Singh Thakur,
Village Surajpur, P.O. Dhaliara,
Tehsil Dehra, Distt. Kangra, H.P.

नियन्त्रक, मुद्रण तथा लेखन सामग्री, हिमाचल प्रदेश, शिमला–5 द्वारा मुद्रित तथा प्रकाशित
इलेक्ट्रॉनिक हस्ताक्षरित राजपत्र, वैबसाइट http://rajpatrahimachal.nic.in पर उपलब्ध है एवम् ऑनलाइन सत्यापित किया जा सकता है